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This is the text of the paper which I delivered before Georg Wolf and a few 
stragglers from one of the dinners on the weekend which he organised to 
celebrate his retirement. The paper commenced at half past one in the 
morning. A few hours later Georg said that he understood the significance of 
the case Cantiere San Rocco but not that of Donoghue v. Stevenson. Since 2 R.  Evans-Jones  IusCivile.com 
 
Donoghue is far more important it is clearly incumbent upon me to try to put 
my earlier failing right. I do so in appreciation of the inspirational role which 
Georg Wolf played in my own education in Roman law. In his teaching a 
prime concern was the identification of the levels of thought deriving from the 
influence of different hands on the classical texts preserved in the Digest. In 
this paper we see, firstly, how classical Roman law can become highly 
suffused through exposure to a more unusual influence: English law. We also 
see how it has nevertheless proved, on occasion, to be inspirational for English 
law and why the fact of that influence has sometimes had to be suppressed. 
The bridge between Roman law and English law is provided by Scotland.  
I. Introduction  
At a certain stage of their histories Scottish and English private law were very 
different in character. Scots law was strongly influenced by the Civilian 
tradition through the same process of legal development common to much of 
continental Europe called "the reception of Roman law". This was a 
movement which, it is generally thought, had little influence on English law
1. 
The Common law and the Civil law traditions, as represented by English and 
Scots private law, operated in close geographical proximity before 1707 and 
there was <84> certainly a degree of interchange between the two cultures 
during this period
2. The Treaty of Union of 1707 brought the Common law 
and Civil law into a more complex proximity within the single union state of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain comprising, most prominently, the 
different nations of England and Scotland. Ex facie the distinctive nature of 
Scots private law was protected by the recognition of Scotland as a separate 
legal jurisdiction from England by the Union
3. However, in a recent study I 
showed how, especially since the beginning of the nineteenth century, English 
law has been "received" into Scotland as part of a gradual development 
 
1 For a recent assessment see W M. Gordon, 'A Comparison of the Influence of Roman 
Law in England and Scotland' in: The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law, edd. D. Carey 
Miller/R. Zimmermann (Berlin 1997) 135. On the general question of the extent to which 
English law has been influenced by "Roman law", cf., most recently R. Zimmermann, 
'Savigny's Legacy: Legal History, Comparative Law and the Emergence of a European Legal 
Science', 112 (1996) L.Q.R. 576 at 587 ff. <84> 
2 See W.D.H. Sellar, 'The Resilience of the Scottish Common Law' in: The Civilian 
Tradition and Scots Law, edd. D. Carey Miller/R. Zimmermann (Berlin 1997) 225 at p.149. 
3 Cap. 7, article 19. 3 R.  Evans-Jones  IusCivile.com 
 
towards the achievement of one law, or at least similar legal results, in English 
and Scottish private law
4. The existence of two distinct jurisdictions within 
what had developed into the politically centralised single nation state of 
Britain understandably led to pressure to assimilate English and Scots law
5. 
The co-existence of two distinct legal traditions in England and Scotland must 
also have appeared odd in the light of the growing perception amongst many 
sections of society that Britain was a cultural unity bound together by a 
common language and traditions
6.  
  The great difference in the stature of England and Scotland within the 
Union made it inevitable that development towards legal unity was achieved, 
in the main, by the assimilation of Scots law with English law. A result was 
that Scots private law gradually lost many of its "Civilian" characteristics. 
Paradoxically a model for the convergence of Scots and English law was in all 
likelihood provided by the Civilian tradition. Legal unity was required of the 
new European nation states that were being forged during the nineteenth 
century. Codification, which was the principal means by which this unity was 
brought about, provided a clear example of how different legal traditions could 
be synthesised for the purposes of new political groupings. <85> 
  The development of Scots law towards English law can be typified as 
one of "drift" because it has come about gradually through "reception". 
"Reception" is not in essence a deliberative process. Its distinctive feature is 
that it happens because powerful members of society, normally lawyers, for a 
range of reasons, either partly or wholly, form a preference for a legal tradition 
which is not their own. In this study I will show that, notwithstanding the 
general direction of development of Scots law towards English law, there has 
been a number of occasions this century when English law has actively 
founded upon Scots law to enable it to take important steps forward. The 
examples which I examine concern areas where Scots law was once based, or 
 
4 'Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and the Myth of the Genius of Scots Private 
Law', 114 (1998) L.Q.R. 228. The fact that there was a drift of Scots law towards English law 
is now becoming more widely accepted; see, most recently, H. MacQueen /W.D.H. Sellar, 
'History of Negligence in Scots Law', Northern Cross (OUP), edd. K.G.C. Reid/R. 
Zimmermann (forthcoming) who pose the following important question: "How does one 
explain the apparent shift in orientation of Scots law in the course of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries from the Civil to the Common law?" 
5 See R. Evans-Jones, op. cit. n. 4. 
6 As regards this perception amongst Scots lawyers, see Alan Rodger, 'Thinking about 
Scots Law', (1996) 1 Edinburgh Law Rev. 3. See also idem, 'The Codification of Commercial 
Law in Victorian Britain', 108 (1992) L.Q.R. 570. <85> 4 R.  Evans-Jones  IusCivile.com 
 
was at least perceived to have been based, on Civilian principles. This is a 
point worth stressing because it presents something of a puzzle. Scots law, 
because of "reception" in the areas that will be examined had in fact already 
adopted English law by the time of the latter's re-orientation. English law then 
founded upon the Civilian principles that had earlier been part of Scots law 
because they were seen to produce better results than the contemporary 
English law now in force in both England and Scotland.  
  The central role in the practice of drawing on Scots law, and through it, 
on the Civil law, for the benefit of England has been played by the House of 
Lords acting as the court of final appeal in private law matters for both 
jurisdictions. Some judges of the House of Lords clearly saw the practical 
utility in founding sometimes on the traditions of both Scotland and England 
in the formation of one law for Britain. Provided one accepts the desirability 
of the end result — one law for one Britain — this is entirely sensible. The 
United Kingdom has an extraordinarily rich legal heritage drawn from both 
the Common law and the Civil law on which to build a new law for Britain. 
However, the House of Lords does not have the legislative power which 
makes what is often the forced legal synthesis of codification possible. I will 
show that a fundamental difficulty confronting the approach of the House of 
Lords in this matter has been the strict interpretation of what constitutes a 
binding precedent in English law.  
  I will examine three decisions of the House of Lords which arose in the 
following chronology: Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Co. Ltd (1923)
7;  Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932)
8 and Fibrosa 
Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd (1943)
9. Cantiere 
and Fibrosa will be discussed together because they concern the same subject 
matter. A central figure in the discussion is Lord Atkin. He had shown a keen 
interest in <86> the difficulties which Cantiere was concerned to resolve
10. 
With Lord Macmillan he was also a member of the Judicial Committee of the 
House of Lords that heard both Donoghue and Fibrosa. The decisions in 
Donoghue and Fibrosa effected major changes in English law but the debt to 
the Civil law that these decisions owed has never been acknowledged. The 
reason, I will argue, in essence concerns the problem of precedent referred to 
 
7 1923 S.C. 725; 1923 S.C. (H.L.) 105. 
8 1929 S.C. 461; 1932 S.C. (H.L.) 31; [1932] A.C. 562. 
9 [1943] A.C. 32. <85> 
10 Russkoe Obscheslvo D'Lia Izgslovlenia Snariadov L'Voennick Pripassov v. John Stirk 
and Sons Ltd, (1922) 10 Ll. L. Rep. 214 at p. 216. 5 R.  Evans-Jones  IusCivile.com 
 
above. If either Fibrosa or Donoghue were to have been decided expressly on 
Scottish authorities, neither would have operated immediately as a source of 
English law and as a precedent for the British Empire beyond which was Lord 
Atkin's aim. That this would have been the case was a lesson learnt by Lord 
Atkin from Cantiere.  
II. Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd  
The case concerned a sale of marine engines to be manufactured and supplied 
by the defenders. Payment of the price was to be made in instalments; the first 
on signature of the contract and the remainder at specified stages in the 
construction of the engines. After payment of the first instalment, but before 
construction of the engines had commenced, the outbreak of war rendered 
further performance of the contract legally impossible. The point at issue was 
whether the pursuers could recover the sum that they had paid as the first 
instalment. The issue, though seemingly simple, was one which had to be 
resolved by the House of Lords.  
  It was accepted at all levels of the appeal that had the contract been 
void ab initio, or that had the performance failed as a result of the fault of the 
sellers, the pursuers would have been entitled to recover what they had paid, 
provided in the latter case that they had chosen first to rescind the contract. 
However, the non-performance of the contract was not attributable to the 
sellers' fault and the effect of the outbreak of war was merely to discharge the 
parties from further performance of their duties and not to render the contract 
void. This being the case, one approach to the issue of recoverability of the 
first instalment of the price was that everything done in fulfilment of the 
contract up to the moment of frustration was rightly done. In effect there was 
said to be a general rule that losses arising from performance of a contract up 
to the moment of frustration should lie where they fall. The main authority for 
this approach was Chandler v. Webster
11, one of the so-called "Coronation" 
cases of English law. A house owner let seats to view a Coronation procession 
for a sum of £141 which was payable before the procession. £100 was paid in 
advance and £41 was still out- <87> standing when the procession was 
cancelled due to the King's illness. The parties sued each other, the house 
owner for the balance of £41 and the other party for recovery of his £100. The 
Court of Appeal held that the house owner was entitled to retain what he had 
 
11 See also esp. Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740. <87> 6 R.  Evans-Jones  IusCivile.com 
 
received. Consistent with the reasoning that this payment was "rightly" made 
in fulfilment of an existing obligation, it was also held that the house owner 
was entitled to the balance of £41 because the obligation in respect of this sum 
was also referable to the time before the frustration and therefore still properly 
exigible.  
 When  Cantiere was heard on appeal before the Court of Session 
recovery of the price was denied mainly on the authority of the "Coronation" 
cases. The alternative approach to the issue of recoverability found in the 
pleadings, which was subsequently to be approved by the House of Lords, was 
that the prepayment was recoverable in principle on the grounds that it had 
been given for a consideration that had failed. The inspiration for 
recoverability was found in the condictio causa data causa non secuta 
(condictio c. d.) of Roman and Scots law.  
III. Further Analysis of the "Coronation" Cases  
Frustration does not annul a contract but merely operates to terminate future 
performance. In such circumstances, according to the "Coronation" cases, 
losses should be allowed to lie where they fall at the moment of frustration. 
This approach did not preclude re-adjustment of the relations of the parties. 
The critical enquiry concerned what the parties had performed in fulfilment of 
obligations that were properly enforceable up to the moment of frustration. 
Thus if, by chance, P had paid a sum in advance which was not in fact exigible 
until after the frustrating event, he could claim it back. The approach of the 
courts appears to have been one of allocation of risk under a valid, albeit 
unenforceable, contract. The result was harsh in the circumstances where, for 
example, P had agreed to pay the full price in advance for the manufacture of 
certain goods since he would lose the money without being entitled to the 
goods. However, it was open to him either to insure or to provide for an 
alternative allocation of losses expressly in the contract.  
  We should note that although "total failure of consideration" appears as 
a concept in the pleadings in the "Coronation" cases, very little indeed is said 
about it in the judgments. The emphasis, in what is regarded as the locus 
classicus for the approach of the "Coronation" cases
12, is that the validity of 
the contract excluded a claim for "total failure of consideration". The 
reasoning was that, if the contract still subsists, regulation of the relationship 
 
12 Per Collins M. R. at p. 499. <88> 7 R.  Evans-Jones  IusCivile.com 
 
of the par- <88> ties is achieved by reference to the contract and not by 
reference to the law of restitution
13. Thus Collins M. R. observed in 
Chandler
14:  
the doctrine of failure of consideration does not apply. The rule adopted by the 
Courts in such cases is I think to some extent an arbitrary one, the reason for its 
adoption being that it is really impossible in such cases to work out with any 
certainty what the rights of the parties in the event which has happened should be.  
IV. Further Analysis of Cantiere  
The cause of action expressed by the condictio c. d. lies within the law of 
unjustified enrichment. Thus Cantiere differed from the "Coronation" cases in 
the fundamental respect that it established a claim for unjustified enrichment 
on the grounds of failure of consideration where a contract had been 
frustrated.  Cantiere also cleared up doubts concerning the nature of the 
consideration in a reciprocal contract and the circumstances in which its 
failure was "total".  
  The foundation of the pursuer's claim in Cantiere was the condictio c. 
d. of Roman law. This provides a claim where something is given for a causa 
that fails. It was assumed by the House of Lords that the failure of causa was 
no different from a failure of consideration. As I will show below, the House 
of Lords' understanding of the condictio c. d. was not fully consistent with 
either Roman or Scots law. It was certainly the claim of English law 
concerning total failure of consideration that was partly the model on which 
the House of Lords understood the condictio. Thus, when dealing with the 
condictio c. d., Lord Shaw was concerned, for example, to demonstrate that 
the consideration had "entirely" failed
15. The failure of "consideration" was 
seen to consist of the non-supply of the engines, the actual supply of the 
engines being the reciprocation for which the buyer had paid the price
16. 
 
13 This is the approach adopted by the House of Lords in the recent Scottish Appeal, 
Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd v. CIN Properties Ltd, 1998 SLT 992 with the difference that 
on this occasion the relationship between the parties was expressly regulated by the terms of 
the contract. See further, H. MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent 
Liability: A Scots Perspective', 1997 Acta Juridica 176. 
14 At p. 499. 
15 At p.117. 
16 At p. 117. 8 R.  Evans-Jones  IusCivile.com 
 
Therefore price and res were regarded as the reciprocal considerations within 
a normal contract of sale. 
  The House of Lords was of the view that, at least on the facts before 
them, it was not possible to split up the consideration
17 by attributing part of it 
to the signing of the contract and the remainder to the delivery of the res. 
Thus, each party was seen to perform in consideration of the full performance 
by the other <89> party. Any difficulties concerning the coincidence between 
"frustration" and "(total) failure of consideration" were thereby resolved. 
Frustration of a sale which has not been fully performed in respect of the 
payment of price and delivery of the res will normally give rise to a claim of 
(total) failure of consideration since anything short of full performance in 
these respects is normally a total failure. 
  The effect of the decision in Cantiere was to introduce a rule of 
general application to frustrated contracts in Scots law that what is transferred 
in fulfilment of the contract is recoverable subject to any counter-claim by the 
other party for expenses which he had incurred in the performance of his side 
of the bargain. Instead of following the general rule of contemporary English 
law that losses should be left to lie where they fall, the House of Lords in 
Cantiere applied the law of unjustified enrichment to strike a balance between 
the parties. It was, and remains, unclear from the terms of the decision whether 
this balance was to be struck strictly according to the principles of 
"enrichment" or whether the first defender was entitled to counter-claim for 
losses which he had incurred even if the other party had not been enriched 
thereby. The general rule of rei interitus that res perit domino was seen to be 
inapplicable to a case of this kind because no res had ever come into existence 
to which risk could attach.  
V. Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd  
It was twenty years before the House of Lords was provided with the 
opportunity to bring English law into conformity with Scots law as expressed 
in its decision in Cantiere. As Lord Macmillan observed in Fibrosa "The mills 
of the law grind slowly"
18. The facts of Fibrosa were similar to those of 
Cantiere. A contract of sale was concluded for the supply of machinery. As 
required, part of the price had been paid in advance before the contract was 
 
17 Per Lord Shaw at p. 117. <89> 
18 At p. 58. <90> 9 R.  Evans-Jones  IusCivile.com 
 
frustrated by the outbreak of war. At issue was whether the advance payment 
could be recovered or not. 
  The decision of the House of Lords in Cantiere had a very significant 
influence on Fibrosa. Cantiere regulated the interests of parties to a frustrated 
contract by reference to a claim in the law of unjustified enrichment 
effectively on the grounds of total failure of consideration. The availability of 
this claim established the principle of recoverability in such circumstances 
which broke apart the approach represented by the "Coronation" cases which 
Fibrosa overruled. <90> 
  Whereas "failure of consideration" was barely mentioned in the 
judgments in the "Coronation" cases, it was the essential factor on which the 
decision in Fibrosa was made to turn. In approaching the case from this point 
of view Fibrosa had to confront a central problem of definition. A 
considerable degree of uncertainty was apparent in the "Coronation" cases and 
in Cantiere, when it was before the Court of Session, as to what constituted 
the consideration for payment. The problem was that in English law 
"consideration" is a term which has different meanings depending on whether 
it is used in a contractual or restitutionary sense. Viscount Simon in Fibrosa 
distinguished these meanings in the following manner"
19:  
... in the law relating to the formation of contract, the promise to do a thing 
may often be the consideration, but when one is considering the law of failure 
of consideration and the quasi-contractual right to recover money on that 
ground, it is, generally speaking, not the promise which is referred to as the 
consideration, but the performance of the promise ...:  
  The "Coronation" cases were seen to have confused these meanings. 
By excluding a claim for total failure of consideration because of the validity 
of the contract they ascribed the consideration to the promise and not to its 
performance. The "factual" conception of the restitutionary meaning of failure 
of consideration as dependent on the performance of the promise is, arguably, 
another level on which Cantiere influenced Fibrosa. As stated, according to 
the House of Lords in Cantiere the price was paid for the supply of the 
engines. That this conclusion was reached from an understanding of the 
operation of the condictio c. d. in Roman law, albeit accommodated to the 
requirement of English law that the failure of consideration must be "total", is 
made clear by Lord Shaw
20:  
 
19 At p. 48. 
20 At p.117. <91> 10 R.  Evans-Jones  IusCivile.com 
 
The consideration as a whole stands with reference to the price and every part of the 
price. It is an admitted fact in the case that that consideration has entirely failed. 
Therefore, this, as I say, would be a typical case of restitution under the Roman law 
and one for the application of the maxim causa data causa non secuta. The condictio 
under that head would have been, in my humble opinion, plainly applicable. If not 
applicable to this and to similar cases of outstanding simplicity, then the whole 
chapter of the Roman law devoted to that condictio need never have been written.  
  The significant feature of the condictio c. d. is its formulation in terms 
of "dare".  Dare emphasises the failure of the actual performance of the 
bargain because, within a sale for example, it focuses, not on the existence of 
the promise, but on its execution; the price is given for the consideration of the 
object of the sale which is then not forthcoming. <91> 
  By understanding the condictio c. d. as it did, the House of Lords in 
Cantiere found the justification for the application of a claim of unjustified 
enrichment to frustrated contracts on the basis of failure of consideration. In 
terms of its use of unjustified enrichment (restitution) in this context and its 
principal result, Cantiere was the model for Fibrosa. The importance of this 
change in conception is observed by Goff and Jones
21:  
the so-called rule in Chandler v. Webster, rested on the misconception that there 
could be no total failure of consideration unless the contract was void ab initio. 
Severely criticised by judge and jurist, the fallacy underlying Chandler v. Webster 
was exposed in Fibrosa.  
VI. Roman Law and Scots Law Misunderstood 
Roman law was seen to have allowed a claim of unjustified enrichment in the 
form of a condictio c. d. on frustration of a contract of sale. However, the 
House of Lords misconstrued the operation of the condictio c. d. both in 
Roman law and Scots law
22. The essential point is that this claim applies only 
outwith contract. Roman law recognised a numerus clausus of agreements as 
contracts. One difficulty which this created was what to do when one party 
 
21 The Law of Restitution (4th ed., London 1993) 407 f. 
22 See W. W. Buckland, 'Casus and Frustration in Roman Law and Common Law', (1932-
3) 46 Harvard L.R. 128; R. Evans-Jones, 'Unjust Enrichment, Contract and the Third 
Reception of Roman Law in Scotland', (1993) 109 L.Q.R. 663; G.D. MacCormack, 'The 
Condictio Causa Data Causa Non Secuta', in: The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland, ed. R. 
Evans-Jones (Stair Society 1995) 253. 11 R.  Evans-Jones  IusCivile.com 
 
had transferred something under an agreement that was not binding as a 
contract and the other party then refused to perform his part of the bargain. 
Since the counter-performance was unenforceable, the first party was allowed 
to recover what he had transferred with the condictio c. d. In Scots law the 
function of the condictio c. d. is still basically the same
23. There is a penumbra 
of agreements which, although perfectly legal, are unenforceable as contracts 
notwithstanding the acceptance by modern law of the principle that all 
agreements seriously intended to have legal effect should be recognised as 
contracts (pacta servanda sunt). It is within this narrow zone that the condictio 
c. d. applies. For example, P sets you up as a dentist provided you marry his 
son. Having taken his money you then think better of the marriage. P cannot 
insist that you marry his son or claim damages for your repudiation but he is 
entitled to recover what he gave you. <92> 
 The  condictio c. d., properly understood, simply cannot operate 
properly within the context of valid contracts. In the Civilian tradition a party 
to a valid contract performs his obligations, not to receive the reciprocation 
promised by the other party, but to discharge his obligations under the 
contract. Thus, when the buyer paid the price in Cantiere, because he thereby 
discharged his obligation to pay, the causa was in fact secuta! In other words, 
the House of Lords applied the condictio c. d. to facts to which, by definition, 
it was inapplicable. It is dangerous to think of the condictio c. d. as a claim to 
recover what is given for a "consideration" that fails because of the confusion 
which this engenders with contractual consideration. Lord Shaw in Cantiere 
relied heavily on H.J. Roby's analysis of the condictio c. d. in Roman law
24. 
Roby speaks of this claim as concerning what was given for a "purpose" that 
failed. A further interesting feature of Cantiere is how Lord Shaw slips from 
the language of "purpose" to "consideration". This is not the context in which 
to examine the problems that the introduction by the House of Lords of the 
condictio c. d. into the field of contract has caused in Scots law. Suffice it to 
say that they remain serious
25. 
 
23 See R. Evans-Jones, 'The Claim to Recover what was Given for a Lawful Purpose 
Outwith Contract that Fails', 1997 Acta Juridica 139. <92> 
24 Lord Shaw and Roby were friends; see A. Rodger, 'The Use of the Civil Law in Scottish 
Courts', in: The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law, edd. D. Carey Miller/R. Zimmermann 
(Berlin 1997) 225 at p. 228. 
25 See esp. J.A. Dieckmann and R. Evans-Jones, 'The Dark Side of Connelly v. Simpson', 
1995 J.R. 90; R. Evans-Jones, 'The Claim to Recover what was Transferred for a Lawful 
Purpose Outwith Contract that Fails', 1997 Acta Juridica 139. 12 R.  Evans-Jones  IusCivile.com 
 
VII. A Restitutionary Response to Frustration of Contract  
Scots and English law drew upon the model of Roman law in its perceived use 
of the law of unjustified enrichment in cases of frustration. Thereby the 
principle of recoverability of benefits was established. However, the further 
consequences of the restitutionary approach were not worked out. Fibrosa is 
particularly surprising in this regard. Differently from the position adopted in 
Cantiere, it was stated that the sellers in Fibrosa were not entitled to set-off 
the expenses which they had incurred in the performance of their contract
26. It 
seems, therefore, that the harsh consequence for the buyer who had paid the 
full price in advance resulting from the rules expressed in the "Coronation" 
cases was replaced in Fibrosa by an equally harsh result for the seller who had 
incurred expense in preparation of the performance of the contract. It is likely 
that this result was seen to be supportable only because it was known by the 
time of the decision in Fibrosa that a new statutory regime would shortly be 
introduced governing frustration of contracts in English law. Given the back- 
<93> ground against which it was enacted it is understandable why the Law 
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 introduced "a scheme of mutual 
restitution" between the parties to a frustrated contract. The statute solves one 
of the main difficulties arising from Fibrosa by permitting the defendant, 
where it is deemed to be just, to set-off (or recover) expenses which he had 
incurred in the performance of the contract
27. In Scots law, which is still 
governed by Cantiere, confusion exists concerning the criteria to be observed 
in the assessment of the measure of recovery. If, given the nature of the 
condictio c. d., a strict "enrichment" approach is adopted the payee will not be 
entitled to set-off the expenditure which he had incurred if it did not enrich the 
other party
28. For this reason, although there is strong contrary authority
29, it 
has been argued that, instead of "enrichment", principles of equity should be 
observed in the context of frustrated contracts
30.  
  The regulation of the consequences of frustrated contract by means of 
"mutual restitution" is now generally regarded as flawed in certain important 
 
26 Deriving from the logic that there had been a "total" failure of consideration. <93> 
27 Section 1(2). 
28 The defence of change of position is undeveloped in this context. 
29 See Fibrosa per Lord Atkin at p. 54. 
30 Lord Cooper, 'Frustration in Scots Law', (1946) 28 Journal of Comparative Legislation, 
Part III, 1; reproduced in: Selected Papers 1922-1954 (1957) 124. 13 R.  Evans-Jones  IusCivile.com 
 
respects
31. Modern statutory provisions have generally preferred an approach 
which provides for a fair apportionment of losses between the parties
32. This 
differs even from the "equitable" approach to Cantiere
33. Thus, it seems that 
the restitutionary response to frustrated contracts, which was initiated in 
Britain by Cantiere, is now perceived to be unsatisfactory. One recent 
commentator speaks of its "grave deficiencies"
34. This takes us back full circle 
to the "Coronation" cases. The solution to the "Coronation" cases could have 
been to change the content of the rules governing the allocation of losses 
under the contract. However one set of inflexible rules may thereby merely 
have been replaced by another. The real need was to establish a means within 
the law of contract whereby such adjustments between the parties as was fair 
in all the circumstances of the case could be made. The application of a 
principle of bona <94> fides comes to mind as one possible option. It was 
precisely the lack of flexibility in the law of contract of both Scotland and 
England which was solved in the context of frustration by reference to the law 
of unjustified enrichment. It imports a different set of rules which were used to 
achieve results which conformed with what was seen to be just in the field of 
contract. The witness of the fact that the essence of the problem was not 
addressed by this approach is that the restitutionary regimes governing 
frustration of contract in Britain now do not find widespread favour.  
VIII. Some General Observations: One Law for Britain  
Cantiere was a Scottish appeal. At first instance it was held that the first 
payment was recoverable. On appeal in the Court of Session this decision was 
reversed, but before the House of Lords the right of recovery was affirmed 
once more. The reasoning adopted to justify recovery or non-recovery at each 
stage of the appeal relied either on the authority of the "Coronation" cases or 
upon the condictio c. d.  
 
31 See the instructive study by E. McKendrick, 'Frustration, Restitution, and Loss 
Apportionment', in: Essays on the Law of Restitution, ed. A. Burrows (Oxford 1991) 147. 
32 The British Columbian Frustrated Contracts Act 1974, the New South Wales Frustrated 
Contracts Act 1978, and the South Australian Frustrated Contracts Act 1988. 
33 McKendrik, op. cit. at p. 166. The payee's claim "does not hinge upon the fortuitous 
circumstance of the making of a prepayment by the payer; the payee can bring his expenditure 
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  The House of Lords saw there to be a fundamental difference of 
principle between English law and Scots law, at least when the latter was 
properly understood
35, concerning the issue of recoverability. Contemporary 
English law was seen to be regulated by the "Coronation" cases and the result 
of non-recoverability which they imported was, and indeed had been, regarded 
as highly unsatisfactory for some time in England before the decision of the 
House of Lords in Cantiere. Lord Shaw observed
36:  
I am not surprised that there is in high legal quarters a feeling both of uneasiness and 
of disrelish as to the English rule, and that that feeling has found expression. I cite, 
for instance, the language of Sir Frederick Pollock in his work on Contracts (8th ed.), 
p. 440, in which, summing up the English decisions, he observes: — "The contract is 
not avoided when the failure of condition assumed as its foundation is ascertained, 
but all outstanding obligations under it, and those only, are discharged; that is, 
payments already made cannot be recovered back, and any payment actually accrued 
due is still recoverable. Only the House of Lords can review these decisions, but they 
are not universally approved in the profession". 
  Although the contemporary English law was regarded as unsatisfactory 
by English lawyers, it was precisely due to the influence of English law that 
recovery had been denied when Cantiere was heard on appeal in the Court of 
Session. Lord Shaw is also instructive in this regard
37: <95> 
I cannot avoid feeling that any Scotch Judge would have decided this case in favour 
of the appellants on principles well known to the Roman law, and also for at least 
over two centuries embodied in the law of Scotland, had it not been for the intrusion 
of ideas derived from English law, and from principles which are neither Scotch nor 
Roman, and which, as I shall show, are viewed with uncertainty, even in England 
itself.  
  Later Lord Shaw is more forceful concerning his own view of the 
merits of contemporary English law. Clearly with the "Coronation" cases in 
mind he said
38:  
Counsel was right; the "something for nothing" doctrine goes the whole length. This 
result under other systems of jurisprudence might be viewed as monstrous; but in 
England, it was contended, this is the law ...  
 
35 As not being bound by the "Coronation" cases. 
36 At p.121. 
37 At p. 116. <95> 
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  Before the decision of the House of Lords in Cantiere, the same 
position had been reached in Scotland as in England concerning the recovery 
of payments made in fulfilment of a contract which was subsequently 
frustrated. Scots law had adopted English law on this point. The position of 
English law had been regarded as unsatisfactory by English lawyers for some 
time before the Scottish appeal reached the House of Lords. The House of 
Lords relied upon Roman law to reach a result in Scotland that was both 
different from the contemporary English law and consistent with what would 
have been regarded as satisfactory in England had the case been an English 
appeal. More precisely, since the condictio c. d., as conceived by the House of 
Lords, was identical to "total failure of consideration" the condictio c. d. was 
really a contrived bridge over which to draw the cause of action of English law 
into the field of frustration. Although, as a matter of fact, the English 
"Coronation" authorities were followed by the Court of Session when it 
reached its decision in Cantiere, they were not regarded as binding precedents 
for Scots law by the House of Lords.  
  The House of Lords in Cantiere approved the foundation of the 
pursuer's claim on the condictio c. d. of Roman law. Quite correctly the 
Committee also regarded Roman law as a source of Scots law only to the 
extent that it had been "received" as part of Scots law. Nevertheless classical 
Roman law and Scots law were regarded as essentially the same in this 
context. Again I refer to Lord Shaw who, when analysing the nature of the 
condictio c. d., said
39:  
I am happy to cite, in connexion with this topic, the views of that great scholar and 
latinist, Mr Roby. He deals in his observations in the fifth chapter of his Roman 
Private Law, book V., chapter 3, on Condictiones, with this one. ... And upon the 
substance of the matter I desire to quote the quite remarkable exposition of the 
condiction which Mr Roby gives, remarkable because it expresses not only the true 
foundation, but almost the precise limits and extent of the principle involved; and it 
<96> does so in language which is, according to my view, entirely consistent with 
the development of the doctrine in the law of Scotland ...  
  Besides a fairly extensive discussion of Roman law, with references to 
jurists like Ulpian, Africanus, Celsus and Paul, the judgments in the House of 
Lords are remarkable for their strong reliance on the works of the Scottish 
institutional writers like Stair, Bankton and Erskine. A decision drawn from 
Roman law and the Scottish institutional writers could not, as it turned out, 
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possibly act as an authority for English law even although, if Lord Shaw is to 
be believed, the result achieved in Cantiere was precisely what was desired for 
English law by their leading lawyers of the time. As an ancillary point it is 
also worth noting that the prospect of a different result being achieved in Scots 
law from English law was regarded by the House of Lords as undesirable as a 
matter of principle. The view appears to have been that, especially perhaps in 
commercial matters, it was preferable to have one law governing Britain. Thus 
Viscount Finlay observed
40:  
It would be unfortunate that in matters of this kind, which may, as here, affect 
foreigners, the results should be different in the two parts of Great Britain.  
Summary  
It is likely that the condictio c. d. of Roman law was seen by the House of 
Lords as the means to achieve a better result for both Scots and English law in 
the regulation of frustrated contracts. The condictio c. d. of Roman law had 
been perceived as essentially the same claim as that of English law to recover 
what was paid for a consideration that had totally failed, with the difference 
that the former was seen to be available following frustration of contract 
whereas the latter, because of the doctrine enshrined in the "Coronation" cases, 
was not. The application of the condictio to cases of frustration in Cantiere 
was attributed to Roman law which in turn was seen to determine the proper 
scope of that claim in Scots law and the similar claim of English law. The 
desire immediately to achieve a different and better result in both Scotland and 
England was, however, defeated by the character of the judgments in Cantiere 
which emphasised the Civilian origins of the doctrine. Generally, Lord Shaw 
was regarded as having over-stated his case. Lord Chancellor Simon's 
displeasure is evident when in Fibrosa he observed that "Lord Dunedin's 
restraint was not imitated by Lord Shaw"
41. The House of Lords had to wait 
twenty years after Cantiere before it was able to achieve a uniform result for 
both Scotland and England in its Fibrosa decision. Cantiere, I suggest, was 
the model for Fibrosa. <97> 
  The difficulties in using Cantiere as an authority in English law will 
certainly have been observed by Lord Atkin who had occasion to deal with 
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cases on frustration when sitting in the Court of Appeal
42. When the Scottish 
appeal of Donoghue v. Stevenson came before the House of Lords he saw it as 
an opportunity immediately to extricate English law from the unsatisfactory 
state in which he found one aspect of the law of negligence. A hurdle that he 
had to overcome was to persuade his Scottish colleague, Lord Macmillan, that 
he should not repeat the mistakes made most prominently by Lord Shaw 
which had prevented an immediate solution to a pressing problem that was 
seen to exist at the time of Cantiere in both English and Scottish law.  
IX. Donoghue v. Stevenson  
Introduction  
This Scottish case can be better understood by placing it in the wider setting of 
the decisions of the House of Lords in Cantiere and Fibrosa. I will draw on 
the important discovery by Alan Rodger
43 that Lord Macmillan re-wrote his 
judgment in Donoghue very shortly before it was given in order to exclude the 
"native" Scottish authorities on which the first final version of his judgment 
was partly based. I will confirm Rodger's "speculation" that Lord Macmillan 
was prevailed upon by Lord Atkin to suppress the Scottish authorities in order 
to ensure that Donoghue could immediately be founded upon as a precedent 
by English law. I differ from Rodger on the significance which I attribute to 
this excision of the Scottish authorities. Certainly, given the history of 
Cantiere, it was necessary to make this change if Lord Atkin's aim were 
immediately to be achieved by Donoghue. In fact the Scots law that was 
excised by Lord Macmillan was not as insignificant as Rodger suggests. It 
contained references to a general principle of delictual liability which found its 
origin in the Lex Aquilia. The nature of Aquilian liability in Roman law had 
been transformed in the hands of practising lawyers during the period of the 
ius commune. This liability was then given expression as a general principle 
by the natural lawyers and by the Scottish institutional writers on whom the 
natural lawyers had exerted a profound influence
44. I will show that Donoghue 
 
42 Russkoe Obschestvo D'Lia Izgstovlenia Snariadov L'Voennick Pripassov v. John Stirk 
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was a very finely balanced de- <98> cision which involved a major difference 
of view between, principally, Lord Atkin and Lords Buckmaster and Tomlin. 
The general principle of delictual liability drawn from the Civilian tradition 
was certainly one, and conceivably a critical, inspiration for Lord Macmillan's 
decision which in turn was followed by Lord Atkin in certain significant 
respects. The conclusion to be drawn is that the general principles of delictual 
liability formulated by the Civil law played an important role in a decision 
which is recognised as having created the foundations of a central part of the 
Common law of negligence. Why it was thought necessary to suppress the fact 
that "native" Scots law, and through it the Civil law, had played this role in 
Donoghue is also explained.  
The Facts  
There are few cases whose facts are better known. Mrs Donoghue drank part 
of a bottle of ginger beer bought for her by a friend when they were taking 
refreshments in a cafe in Paisley. Her friend then poured out the remaining 
contents of the bottle which contained a snail in a state of decomposition. Mrs 
Donoghue sustained shock (presumably from the sight of the snail) and illness 
from the contents she had drunk and raised a claim in delict against the 
manufacturer for compensation. She averred that the defender had been 
negligent in the manufacture of the ginger beer, principally in allowing a snail 
to enter the bottle that she had consumed. The defence was that a manufacturer 
owed no duty of care to a consumer with whom he had no contract unless the 
facts fell within two well known exceptions which they did not on this 
occasion. At first instance the pursuer was allowed to go to proof on the issue 
of negligence but this decision was overturned by the Second Division of the 
Court of Session. The Second Division followed English authority in reaching 
its decision that the manufacturer would not have been liable even if he had 
been negligent since he owed no duty of care to Mrs Donoghue. Thus, just as 
in Cantiere, the Court of Session reached its decision on the basis of English 
authorities which, by the time the case came on appeal to the House of Lords, 
were regarded as importing an undesirable result for English law by (some) 
leading English lawyers. It was accepted at all stages of the appeal that 
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English and Scots law were identical in this context. Since Scots law had been 
decided on the basis of English authorities this assumption, subject to an 
important reservation, was not unreasonable. 
The Judgments in the House of Lords  
The decision was carried by a majority of three to two. In this respect it was 
quite evenly balanced. For the reasons that have been intimated, the case was 
pled and judged virtually exclusively on the basis of the English authorities. 
When one observes, as we will see, that the majority of the English judges 
dissented and that it was part of Lord Atkin's purpose that Donoghue should 
im- <99> mediately form a precedent for English law, the fine nature of the 
balance and the critical role played by Lord Macmillan becomes clearer. The 
leading judgment for the dissenting minority was given by Lord Buckmaster 
with whom Lord Tomlin agreed. The other main judgments were given by 
Lord Atkin and Lord Macmillan with whom the other Scot, Lord Thankerton, 
agreed. It is on the principal three judgments that I will concentrate. I will 
highlight a fundamental difference of approach in respect of the merits of the 
contemporary English law that Donoghue was set to clarify. The interpretation 
which Lords Atkin and Macmillan put upon the English authorities was seen 
to import a result in English law which was regarded as nothing short of 
dangerous by Lords Buckmaster and Tomlin. I shall also highlight a different 
method adopted towards the case law by Lords Atkin and Macmillan from 
those who took the opposing view of the merits of the pursuer's claim.  
Lord Buckmaster  
One remarkable feature of Lord Buckmaster's judgment is how often it 
stressed the importance of deciding the case on the basis of the authorities of 
English law. For example, he said
45: 
The law applicable is the common law, and, although its principles are capable of 
application to meet new conditions not contemplated when the law was laid down, 
these principles cannot be changed nor can additions be made to them because any 
particular meritorious case seems outside their ambit.  
  The strength of feeling with which Lord Buckmaster approached the 
issue that a manufacturer might be liable in negligence to persons with whom 
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he had no contractual relationship is consistently emphasised. He said, for 
example
46:  
It is impossible to accept such a wide proposition, and indeed, it is difficult to see 
how, if it were the law, trade could be carried on.  
  Later, still more emphatically, Lord Buckmaster agreed with the 
following statement of Lord Anderson which was made when the Court of 
Session rejected a claim
47 on facts similar to those of Donoghue:  
In a case like the present, where the goods of the defenders are widely distributed 
throughout Scotland, it would seem little short of outrageous to make them 
responsible to members of the public ...  
  Lord Buckmaster added
48: <100> 
In agreeing, as I do, with the judgment of Lord Anderson, I desire to add that I find it 
hard to dissent from the emphatic nature of the language with which his judgment is 
clothed.  
  In similar vein to Lord Buckmaster, Lord Tomlin talks in Donoghue of 
the "alarming consequences" of accepting the validity of the pursuer's claim
49. 
Given the language in which their judgments were framed there can be no 
doubt whatsoever that the issue was one on which Lords Buckmaster and 
Tomlin had formed views which differed very strongly indeed from the 
remainder of the Committee. As we will see, it is equally clear that Lords 
Atkin and Macmillan had formed correspondingly strong views of the merits 
of their own position.  
  Lord Buckmaster subjected the English authorities to a minute 
examination. His general approach was restrictive in the sense that each case 
was treated as establishing a narrow precedent within an understanding of the 
law that sought to restrict the range of claims of negligence in the context in 
question. He expressed his general conclusion in the following terms
50:  
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In my view, therefore, the authorities are against the appellant's contention; and apart 
from authority, it is difficult to see how any common law proposition can be 
formulated to support her claim.  
Lord Atkin  
Lord Atkin identified the issue as whether, as a matter of law, the defender 
owed any duty to the pursuer to take care. However, he complained
51:  
It is remarkable how difficult it is to find in the English authorities statements of 
general application defining the relations between parties that give rise to the duty (to 
take care).  
  However, where Lord Buckmaster had sought to restrict the authorities 
to narrow propositions, Lord Atkin looked in the same case law precisely for 
evidence of general principles governing English law. Thus he said
52:  
At present I content myself with pointing out that in English law there must be, and 
is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the 
particular cases found in the books are but instances.  
  Thereafter Lord Atkin proceeded to enunciate the general neighbour 
principle for which he has become famous. <101> 
  Throughout his judgment Lord Atkin emphasised the importance of 
principle. However, where he saw an affirmation of this principle
53 in a case 
like Heaven v. Pender
54 Lord Buckmaster had said of the dicta in the same 
case: "that they should be buried so securely that their perturbed spirits shall 
no longer vex the law"
55 and that they have "been used as a tabula in 
naufragio for many litigants struggling in the seas of adverse authority"
56. 
Lord Atkin expressed equally strong views concerning the merits of the 
pursuer's case which, in his view, the existence of the general principle 
supported. Thus, he said
57:  
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It is said that the law of England and Scotland is that the poisoned consumer has no 
remedy against the negligent manufacturer. If this were the result of the authorities, I 
should consider the result a grave defect in the law, and so contrary to principle that I 
should hesitate long before following any decision to that effect ... I do not think so 
ill of our jurisprudence as to suppose that its principles are so remote from the 
ordinary needs of civilised society and the ordinary claims it makes upon its 
members as to deny a legal remedy where there is so obviously a social wrong.  
  The differences between Lord Atkin and Lord Buckmaster were 
clearly very keenly felt indeed.  
Lord Macmillan  
The official version of Lord Macmillan's speech takes a fairly liberal view of 
some of the English authorities. Thus, for example, it assumes that their 
tensions can be explained by the fact that they represent the meeting place of 
two rival (albeit fairly elementary
58) principles of law: that no one other than a 
party to a contract can complain of a breach of that contract, and that 
negligence apart from contract gives a right of action to the party injured by 
that negligence. Lord Macmillan concludes that "Where, as in cases like the 
present, so much depends upon the avenue to the question, it is very easy to 
take the wrong turning"
59. We might speculate on what Lord Buckmaster 
made of such a liberal treatment of the English authorities by a Scottish judge 
and the implicit correction of his own approach which this statement implied.  
  In his more detailed treatment of the authorities Lord Macmillan's 
stated purpose was to show that "there is in the English reports no such 
unbroken and <102> consistent current of decisions" as would justify the 
aspersion that the law of England has committed itself irrevocably to what is 
neither reasonable nor equitable"
60. Later, in the same manner as Lord Atkin, 
Lord Macmillan took an abstract approach which sought once more to identify 
in the cases general principles governing the identification of the 
circumstances in which there was a duty to take care
61.  
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The First Final Version of Lord Macmillan's Speech
62  
Alan Rodger discovered that Lord Macmillan had prepared a final version of 
his judgment which, shortly before it was given, was reworked in some 
important respects. In this version, instead of declaring, as he did in the 
official speech, that English law showed no "unbroken and consistent current 
of decisions" against the pursuer's claim, Lord Macmillan concluded
63: 
I am prepared to agree that the general, though by no means the uniform, trend of 
English decisions below has been adverse to the admission of such a claim as your 
Lordships are considering in the present appeal. But the matter is open in your 
Lordship's House.  
  We can well understand how undesirable such an admission that the 
English authorities were against the pursuer's claim would have appeared in 
the eyes of Lord Atkin. He was in the minority of the English judges in his 
interpretation of the English cases and had to rely on Lord Macmillan's 
support if Donoghue were immediately to act as a precedent in English law. 
Still more problematic in Lord Macmillan's first version of his speech was 
that, as Rodger has observed
64:  
Not only did Lord Macmillan originally begin by looking at the Scots law: he 
actually professed to decide the case on the basis of Scots law and then to go on to 
see, without prejudice to that decision, whether the same result would be reached for 
English law.  
  This approach is reminiscent of Lord Shaw in Cantiere. Lord Atkin, 
sitting in the Court of Appeal, had occasion to comment on the undesirable 
consequences of the "Coronation" cases long before the opportunity arose to 
overrule them in Fibrosa, and he must have been aware of the lessons to be 
learnt from Cantiere
65. Rodger is therefore quite correct in his "speculation"
66 
that <103> Lord Atkin prevailed upon Lord Macmillan to revise his speech 
shortly before it was given in order to ensure that Donoghue would act 
immediately as a precedent for both English and Scots law. We may observe 
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how extraordinarily instrumental both Lord Atkin and Lord Macmillan were 
prepared to be in achieving the result that they desired. We may also speculate 
that this fact was not lost on Lords Buckmaster and Tomlin. The change 
effected by Lord Macmillan in his speech shortly before it was given perhaps 
explains the strength with which the dissenting opinions in Donoghue were 
ultimately framed.  
  As regards the excision from Lord Macmillan's speech of all references 
to the "native" Scottish authorities Rodger observed
67: 
... although Lord Macmillan originally visited what he called "the fountain heads of 
Scots law", his trip was essentially a detour which achieved little even in purely 
Scottish terms. We lost nothing of significance for Scots law when he altered his 
speech in the way in which he did.  
  Rodger recognises that the inspiration for Lord Macmillan's speech in 
support of the pursuer's claim was the "native" Scottish authorities and also 
that reference to these had to be suppressed to achieve wider goals. Whether 
the contribution of Scots law was quite so insignificant as Rodger suggests is a 
point which I doubt. Most importantly, Lord Macmillan commenced his 
treatment of Scots law by reference to the institutional writers. It is no 
coincidence that Erskine is given the greatest prominence since it is in his An 
Institute of the Law of Scotland first published in 1773 that we find the clearest 
expression of the general principle of delictual liability drawn from the 
Civilian tradition which at times has proven to be such a rich source for the 
development of Scots law
68. Erskine says
69:  
Alterum non laedere is one of the three general precepts laid down by Justinian, 
which it has been the chief purpose of all civil enactments to enforce. In consequence 
of this rule, every one who has the exercise of reason, and so can distinguish be- 
tween right and wrong, is naturally obliged to make up the damage befalling his 
neighbour from wrong committed by himself. Wherefore every fraudulent contri- 
vance or unwarrantable act by which another suffers damage, or runs hazard of it, 
subjects the delinquent to reparation.  
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  The other passage to which Lord Macmillan refers
70 from Erskine was 
this
71: <104> 
Wrong may arise not only from positive acts of trespass or injury, but from 
blameable omission or neglect of duty.  
  In Erskine we therefore find a succinct expression of a general 
principle of delictual liability the limits of which are drawn by reference to 
"neighbourhood". Liability is said to arise from acts, omissions or neglect of 
duty. 
X. Influences  
What evidence is there that Erskine was influential on the decision of the 
House of Lords in Donoghue?  
  George v. Skivington
72 and Heaven v. Pender
73 were given particular 
prominence in Lord Atkin's judgment since they contain broad statements 
from which the existence in English law of a general principle equivalent to 
that expressed by Erskine can be deduced. However, the testimony of cases 
like  Heaven v. Pender is problematic. However one reads his judgment 
concerning the existence of a general principle of liability arising from 
negligence
74, Brett M. R. certainly restricted its effect by suggesting that the 
case before him in fact fell within a recognised exception to the position of 
non-recoverability adopted by English law
75:  
This case is also, I agree, within that which seems to me to be a minor proposition — 
namely, the proposition which has often been acted upon, that there was in a sense, 
an invitation of the plaintiff by the defendant, to use the stage.  
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  Another influence upon Lord Atkin in his search for general principle 
was the judgment of Cardozo J. given some years earlier in New York
76 which 
Lord Atkin himself mentions
77. Cardozo J. appears to have been seeking to 
discover a general principle of the law of negligence but his judgment was 
also still constricted by the assumption that a manufacturer did not owe a duty 
of care as a matter of principle to those with whom he had not contracted. In 
his dissenting judgment Willard Bartlett, Ch. J. stated the law as follows
78: 
<105> 
the liability of the vendor of a manufactured article for negligence arising out of the 
existence of defects therein does not extend to strangers injured in consequence of 
such defects but is confined to the immediate vendee. The exceptions to this general 
rule which have thus far been recognized in New York are cases in which the article 
sold was of such a character that danger to life or limb was involved in the ordinary 
use thereof; in other words, where the article sold was inherently dangerous.  
  The significance of Cardozo J.'s judgment lay in the liberality with 
which he was prepared to regard objects as "dangerous"
79.  
  It is possible to view the general principle of liability for negligence 
which Lord Atkin enunciated as a mere confusion arising from the narrow 
exceptions to the opposite position of non-recoverability espoused by Lords 
Buckmaster and Tomlin
80. To the same effect, while admitting a principle of 
recoverability, this might be treated as subject to detailed exceptions which 
defeated the claim in point
81. The first problem, as Lord Atkin saw it, was to 
identify "fundamental principles of the common law"
82 which ensured the 
success of Mrs Donoghue's claim. There is a striking correspondence between 
the general principle of English law as he finally expressed it and Erskine
83:  
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You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably 
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.  
  According to Lords Buckmaster and Tomlin
84, the position in English 
law was to deny a claim on the facts of Donoghue unless it fell within certain 
recognised exceptions. Lords Atkin and Macmillan, by contrast, adopted a 
very different method, the "generality" of which is observed by Rodger
85:  
Essentially what Lord Macmillan did when he prepared the May version (of his 
speech) was to take the generalised reasoning which he had originally used for Scots 
law and apply it to the law of both systems. <106> 
  Similarly, it was by the discovery and application of principle that 
Lord Atkin approached the merits of Mrs Donoghue's claim.  
  For Erskine, "neglect of duty" possibly only arose within a narrow 
class of relationships where persons, because of their position or office, had 
assumed special responsibilities towards the pursuer. The examples he gives 
are of a jailor and a clerk of court
86. However, by the beginning of the 
twentieth century "breach of duty" was expressed as a general precept of the 
Scots law of delict
87:  
and damages will be given only when there is a legal wrong, an invasion of another's 
right; in other words a breach of duty
88.  
  English law, historically, had recognised limited relationships within 
which there might be a "breach of duty"
89. Lord Atkin, by reference to 
"neighbourhood" generalised the class of persons to whom a duty was owed in 
negligence independent of contract
90. However, in response to any extension 
of the Common law Lord Buckmaster had warned: "If one step, why not 
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fifty?"
91 Lord Atkin's further problem was therefore to draw limits to his 
principle that would make it acceptable in the world of practice whose 
interests Lord Buckmaster was protecting. Again Lord Atkin did this by 
reference to the idea of "neighbourhood". He said
92:  
The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems as 
a species of culpa, is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral 
wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. But acts or omissions which any moral 
code would censure cannot, in a practical world, be treated so as to give a right to 
every person injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules of law arise which 
limit the range of complainants and the extent of their remedy ... the lawyer's 
question, "Who is my neighbour?" receives a restricted reply ... The answer seems to 
be — persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought 
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing 
my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. <107> 
  The fact that other judges and other powerful voices of the Common 
law
93 were seeking to broaden the range of the law of negligence provided the 
background against which Lord Atkin gave his famous judgment in 
Donoghue. It is acknowledged that, before he altered his speech, Lord 
Macmillan decided the case on the basis of Scots law. Equally, Lord Atkin, we 
can be sure, was well aware of the native Scots law which formed part of the 
background to the claim
94. The principle found in one of "the fountain heads 
of Scots law" produced the result which Lords Atkin and Macmillan desired 
and there are indications that it also proved influential in respect of the 
method, concepts and language which they adopted in their judgments.  
XI. Significance  
The position in English law preceding Donoghue concerning the limits on the 
range of persons who owed a duty of care in negligence was historically 
based
95. There are certainly indications that some English judges had been 
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94 Hence his reference at p. 44 to systems of law which approached the subject matter of 
the claim on the basis of "culpa". 
95 See S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (2nd ed. 1981) esp. at 
p. 400. Also Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109. 29 R.  Evans-Jones  IusCivile.com 
 
striving to discover a principle of the law of negligence that expressed a more 
general duty of care that included that of a manufacturer towards the consumer 
independent of contract, but the whole area was clouded by contrary authority. 
English law unequivocally effected the discovery of principle in Donoghue.  
  Donoghue has assumed a central position in the ideology of the 
Common law. Rodger describes it as "probably the most famous case in the 
whole Commonwealth world of the Common law"
96. One reason concerns 
central images of the Civil and Common law. The former is seen to be 
principled but (too) abstract. The latter pragmatic but constricted by precedent. 
Donoghue confounds this image of the Common law because of its dynamic 
discovery of principle. An advantage is seen to lie in the discovery of principle 
by judges because it is mediated by the pragmatism of the practical lawyer 
which makes it more workable in the real world.  
  There are grounds on which to question Donoghue's contribution to 
this view of the Common law. All legal systems at times need to find the 
impetus and means to re-orientate. There is a good chance that the majority in 
Dono- <108> ghue drew on Scots law and on the Civilian tradition which lay 
behind it. Given the fact that it was a Scottish appeal this is no bad thing. A 
principle of the Scots law of delict, unfettered by the problems concerning the 
interface between negligence and contract, provided the avenue through which 
to break through the rigidities that had been created in the Common law by 
history and precedent. However, Lord Atkin was certainly creative with what 
he found in Erskine, especially in his elaboration of the neighbourhood 
principle. Donoghue is therefore best seen, not as an example of the Common 
law developing in isolation, but as an important occasion on which the House 
of Lords founded upon the principle of the Civil law
97, and developed it 
through the pragmatism
98 of the Common law in the development of one law 
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for Britain. The bridge between the Common and Civil law was again 
provided by Scotland.  
XII. Conclusions  
Sitting as the highest court of appeal for both jurisdictions, the House of 
Lords, on a number of occasions this century, has actively sought to create a 
unitary law, or to achieve similar results, for both Scottish and English private 
law. The normal practice is that Scots law is made to conform with the law of 
England, even where the principles of its law would not naturally lead to such 
a result. Thus, the desire to achieve a result that was common to both Scotland 
and England provides the most likely explanation for the nature of the recent 
decision in Sharp v. Thomson
99. Yet, sometimes the usual direction of flow 
between Scots and English law is reversed. Recently in Woolwich Building 
Society v. IRC
100, an English appeal before the House of Lords, Lord Goff 
explicitly drew upon the judgments of Lord Mansfield, and on the Civilian 
(and Scottish) condictio indebiti, when stating that over-paid tax in the 
circumstances of the case before him was recoverable in English law on the 
grounds of no consideration
101. Lord Goff was possibly unwise so clearly to 
identify the source of his inspiration. It caused a vigorous reaction amongst 
English academics who successfully argued that such a cause of action drawn 
from the Civil law would <109> be highly damaging if introduced into the 
Common law
102. Nevertheless Woolwich also caused a strong reaction against 
the rule that payments made in mistake of law are irrecoverable. The Law 
Commission shortly thereafter provisionally recommended that the rule should 
be abolished in English law
103. The issue was quickly addressed for Scotland 
in Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Lothian Regional Council
104 
where the Court of Session, with copious references to Civilian authority, 
decided that the cases which introduced the mistake of law rule into Scots law 
from English law had been wrongly decided. The intention in Morgan 
Guaranty was to bring Scots law into line with England concerning the 
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recovery of over-paid taxes after the changes which Woolwich had just 
effected for English law. The leading judgment in Morgan Guaranty was 
given by Lord President Hope who was a member of the House of Lords 
before whom Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Lincoln City Council
105 was recently 
heard. The judgments in that case do not rely, at least expressly
106, to any great 
degree on the Civil law. However, given the background against which the 
decision arose its abolition of the mistake of law rule in English law should 
come as no surprise. 
  My study of Cantiere,  Donoghue and Fibrosa shows that, where 
English law has been perceived to be unsatisfactory, "native" features of Scots 
law were founded upon to achieve what was regarded as desirable results for 
English law. By this means Civilian concepts, albeit mediated through their 
understanding by the judiciary and the interpretation which they receive in 
Scots law, have provided the stimulus for important developments in English 
private law this century. This raises questions concerning the definition of 
"mixed" legal systems. As this term is used of Scots law it is the large degree 
of mixture viewed at a particular time in its history that needs to be explained. 
The degree of mixture can possibly best be explained by the manner in which 
it came about; namely by "reception"
107. 
  It is questionable whether the opportunity to draw on the best features 
of the Common law and Civil law traditions existing within the United 
Kingdom has been fully realised for Britain. The development towards one 
law has been <110> achieved almost exclusively on the basis of English law. 
In my own view this "reception" of English law in Scotland was driven by 
deep running cultural forces and not directly by a desire to achieve results 
which were qualitatively better for Scotland
108. Thus, we saw that Scots law 
had received aspects of English law that, by the time of Cantiere and 
Donoghue, were regarded as unsatisfactory for England by leading English 
lawyers. Nevertheless, on occasion, English law has drawn on Scots law, and 
through Scots law, on its Civilian tradition. This process has been motivated 
by the perception that a different and better result can be achieved for English 
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law. However, the independence of the jurisdictions of England and Scotland 
was maintained by the Union. The authorities of one jurisdiction are therefore 
not formally binding on the other. English law has also never experienced the 
same pressures for "reception" that explains why its law has proved to be so 
influential in Scotland. Cantiere,  Donoghue and Fibrosa show that the 
strength with which English lawyers adhere to their own precedent can create 
an obstacle to the adoption of ideas from different traditions. They also show 
how, on occasion, that obstacle has been overcome. Thus, while English law 
has "borrowed" from Scots law there are also good reasons why the fact of the 
"loan" has sometimes had to be suppressed
109. 
Addendum 
To footnote 106: The article by Zimmermann and Meier appeared as: Sonja Meier and 
Reinhard Zimmermann, 'Judicial Development of the Law, Error Iuris, and the Law of 
Unjustified Enrichment—A View from Germany', 115 (1999) L.Q.R. 556-65. 
 
109 I am grateful to Peter Duff,  Angus Campbell,  Phillip Hellwege,  Geoffrey 
MacCormack, Scott Styles and Neil Walker for their help and comments. 